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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
«• r-> -^ r \ 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I -; • - •=.- Y ?^ r?. is-=d rA.- issues or: thi.s appeal. 
First, fid-..;.:: ^ .. • •. •- ' • De ^  s: 
b'-" Defendant Wayne R. Preston is i.o nr^ally va^ .i;. ^-: 
.2 .- . .J--. - ' ' t'ntiff should nevertheless be -ntirl-.d 
to an equi^ abi-r- mortgage or n*. . ,x^„ : . • -_:.;*: 
owned by Defendant Preston. Plaintiff raises cbis issue 
for ti.-? : * jr:>- .?. ^e^ondlv
 t issue 
exists as f . whether --La.:.:. . . ; s ... *• ~ < . .. ~: 
discharged by Defendant's bankruptcy proceeding. 
STAIEME:I:- O. ?KC\ ;: 
:>urir.-.: 19^n; Defendant Wayne P. . -.s:: - . _ _~ u ' ^ *• 
-. . =" " .•' 1 uames and one Patty Dean for :re purpose: • f Locating 
approximately $350,000.00 in investment funds for a real 
estate development located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Trial transcript, page 12 to page 15.) Later, Plaintiff 
telephoned Defendant and told him that he thought the in-
vestment funds had been obtained. (Trial transcript, page 
15 and pages 35 and 36.) Then, on June 10, 1980, Plaintiff 
flew to Salt Lake City where he met with Defendant and 
viewed the real estate project. 
On that date, Plaintiff delivered to Defendant a check 
in the amount of $10,000.00, which Defendant immediately 
handed back to Plaintiff. (Trial transcript, pages 5 to 7, 
and page 17.) Later that day, after viewing the development 
property, Plaintiff informed Defendant that Defendant would 
need to offer additional collateral for the large invest-
ment loan which Defendant was seeking. At that time, 
Defendant indicated that he had a parcel of real property 
located in Vernal, Utah, which could be used as collateral. 
(Trial transcript, page 20.) Plaintiff then presented 
Defendant with a blank trust deed form, which Defendant 
signed without a notary public being present. Subsequently, 
Mr. Preston's property description was placed on the trust 
deed form, and Plaintiff was designated as Trustee thereof. 
(Trial transcript, page 21 to page 23; page 37, lines 2 to 
-2-
1 - f--n . . • •'• ' -r - v''3C^.ve any consideration for his 
signing ci th~ trusi Ccea. • t.i; ;:.::" *'-a.;re 25.; 
Defendant also testified at trial that he subsequently 
filed ::.:.:._/ " * i. z t1 n T -1 11 n4: i -~ f as an ur ~ 
secured craditet documents relating t •_..-- .cTc ^.c; > r a 
c •-• • - ~ i into evidence h< the trial ccjrt as Exhibit Nc 
Froit *:.;- ettd.-j.. • ,. - s-o ttj d + h - i-";3] '"our4: ^'tun^ that 
Plaintiff's trust d^e.d -.v\iS defect J_V- an; o: .v lei-_ * .-
: • *- ~" trial C O ; T ^ al?^ tx;u; 
Plaintiff c.it,.d was c . t . . . - r-.-fendart' s 
bankruptcy proceeding. Finally, the tr.u.1 c ^rc L_.-C,U :;;at 
-,.i ..f - - -:: =5 *• 1 d aaa.p.s4" Defendant* 
SUMMARY Ut ARGUMENT 
POINT '- Plaintiff *t .tarred from raising the issue 
of equity.-. -. . t •:- • ' -•-'a1 s : nee the issue was 
not raised before the tria. co.*rt, .- ± c::v_ 1 
th-or-- therci was ^h3*- h^ had a valid trust deed regarding 
Defendant's prope.y •- - * ''1 d t" ludarnent 
c,
c
 fcreclcs ir- *. • :^  1 tundamentai t;it; . .... :;.-
it xi> iiciu on appeal to th~ theories upon wh:th 
he rdiev. a*- trial, 
r.r;T^ y ; j : This is :: . i/.appropriate case for appl *.-
doctrine of en-r table mortgage. Defendant re-
ceived nt consideration 
- j -
trust deed, and, furthermore, the parties intended that 
the trust deed be used only to secure an investment loan 
which never materialized. 
POINT III: The findings and judgment of the trial 
court are to be viewed in a light most favorable to them 
and they are presumed to be valid unless the appellant 
meets his burden of showing otherwise. 
POINT IV: Prior to the trial date, Defendant filed 
a bankruptcy petition and was discharged. Defendant's 
purported obligation to Plaintiff was discharged by the 
proceeding, particularly where Plaintiff was an unsecured 
creditor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM NOW RAISING THE 
ISSUE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE, SINCE THAT 
ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Plaintiff's Brief indicates that Plaintiff is 
apparently now willing to concede that his trust deed is 
invalid on its face and defective in several respects, under 
Utah State Law. First, the trust deed was signed by the 
Defendant in blank. Second, the trust deed was not signed 
before a notary public, as required by Utah Law. Third, 
Defendant was not placed under oath at the time he executed 
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the trust deed. Fourth, the trust deed did not meet the 
requirements contained in Utah Code Annotated Section 
57-1-21, which states that a trustee be a member of the 
Utah State Bar, a bank, a building and loan association, or 
other similar entity. Fifth, no consideration was given for 
the trust deed. Sixth, the property description is not 
accurate, since it covers a parcel of ground including 
Defendant's home, which was not intended to be covered. 
(Trial transcript, pages 4 and 27.) Also, First Security 
Bank, who is not a party to this action, has a first 
mortgage on a portion of the property described in 
Plaintiff's trust deed. Clearly, as found by the trial 
court, Plaintiff's trust deed is legally defective. 
To avoid these defects, Plaintiff is now claiming 
on this appeal, for the first time, that the trust deed 
should be upheld under the doctrine of equitable 
mortgage. Even if this doctrine is a recognized 
exception in certain defective trust deed cases, it would be 
clearly inappropriate to now allow Plaintiff to raise this 
issue since it was not presented to the trial court. 
It is a fundamental principal of law that issues not 
raised before the trial court cannot be presented on appeal, 
and that parties on appeal will be held to the theories on 
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which the cause was tried before the lower court. Van Dever 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 629 P.2d 566 (Ariz. App. 1981); 
Robinson v. Spicer, 383 P.2d 844 (Id. 1963); Frost v. Mead, 
383 P.2d 834 (Id. 1963); Chrysler Corporation v. Allen, 
375 P.2d 878 (Ok. 1962). The Supreme Court of Utah has 
stated that "the standard rule is that appellate juris-
diction is the authority to review the actions or judgments 
of an inferior tribunal upon the record made in that tribunal, 
and to modify or reverse such action or judgment." Peatross 
v. Board of Commissions of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 
(Ut. 1976) (citing State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 
1034.) 
In our case, Plaintiff's complaint is straight forward 
in asserting that Plaintiff had a valid trust deed, that 
Defendant Wayne Preston had failed to tender payments which 
were secured by the trust deed, that the trust deed was 
superior to other liens, and that foreclosure of the trust 
deed or lien therefore should be permitted. At trial, 
Plaintiff rested exclusively upon this theory. The trial 
transcript is utterly devoid of any mention of the doctrine 
of equitable mortgage. Because Plaintiff did not raise this 
theory or issue before the trial court, he should not be 
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allowed to raise it for the first time during this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IS 
INAPPROPRIATE HERE SINCE THE NECESSARY 
ELEMENTS ARE LACKING. 
In his attempt to avoid the defective trust deed, 
Plaintiff is contending on this appeal that he should be 
entitled to rely on the doctrine of equitable mortgage. 
Although that doctine may be recognized in certain circum-
stances, it is nevertheless inappropriate in our case 
because essential elements are lacking. 
Court decisions have universally held that a critical 
element for use of the doctine of equitable mortgage is the 
requirement that any equity powers exercised by the court 
must carry out the actual intentions of the parties. In 
Beaulaurier v. Buchanan, 16 Wash. App. 87, 555 P.2d 1372 
(1977), a Washington court held that a prerequisite of an 
equitable mortgage is the intent of the parties to create a 
lien on the subject property, and that if the intent is not 
present, equity will not establish a lien. Furthermore, the 
court indicated that the intent "must appear unequivocally." 
559 P.2d 1374. 
One of the cases relief upon by Plaintiff in his brief, 
Garnett State Sav. Bank v. Tush, 232 Kan. 447,657 P.2d 508 
(1983), also clearly indicates that intention of the parties 
to create a lien is necessary for application of the equitable 
mortgage doctrine. In Garnett, the Supreme Court of Kansas, 
quoting another case, stated that ff(i)f the purpose and 
intention behind a transaction is to secure a debt, equity 
will consider the substance of the transaction and give 
effect to that purpose and intention." 657 P.2d 514 (emphasis 
added). 
The same conclusion has been reached by the Supreme 
Court of Utah. In Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d 333 (Ut. 
1978) , which has also been cited by Plaintiff in this 
brief, the Supreme Court stated that the equitable mortgage 
doctrine is applicable where it was the intention of the 
parties to create such a relationship. 580 P.2d 235. 
In our case, the evidence is confused as to the intent 
of the parties. Defendant Preston states that he executed the 
blank trust deed with the intention of offering certain 
property as collateral for the future investment loan which 
Plaintiff was to obtain. The investment loan, however, did 
not materialize. It cannot be concluded reasonably that the 
parties did intend that the trust deed would be effective 
otherwise. Given this, our case presents a situation where 
the imposition of an equitable mortgage clearly is not in 
keeping with the intention of the parties. 
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The equitable mortgage doctrine is also inappropriate 
here because Defendant did not receive the benefit of the 
consideration as agreed on by the parties. Defendant 
testified that he executed the blank trust deed in anticipated 
consideration of the large investment loan. Because the loan 
was not obtained, consideration was never given to Defendant. 
It should also be noted that the $10,000.00 check delivered 
to Preston on June 10, 19 80, was immediately returned to 
Plaintiff as his finder's fee, and it would not be consistent 
with equity and justice to allow him to recover for his 
failure to perform, by treating the transaction as a secured 
loan. 
A fundamental principle of equitable mortgages is the 
prevention of injustice and inequity. Beck v. Brooks, 224 Kan. 
300, 580 P.2d 882 (1978). In our case, the allowance of an 
equitable mortgage would create an injustice to Defendant, 
because Plaintiff would gain a windfall in the form of a lien 
for which he gave no consideration. This would be manifestly 
unjust, and therefore should not be exercised within the 
realm of equity powers. 
POINT III 
ON APPEAL, THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE VALID AND 
CORRECT, AND THE RECORD WILL BE REVIEWED IN 
A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THEM, AND THEY WILL 
NOT BE DISTURBED IF SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IS 
FOUND IN THE EVIDENCE. 
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Ample support can be found for the proposition that the 
findings of a trial court are presumed to be valid and that 
the reviewing court will examine the record in the light 
most favorable to those findings. Furthermore, the appellant 
must bear the burden of demonstrating any error in the lower 
court. Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Ut. 
1981). 
Interestingly, Plaintiff does not appear to be 
contending that the trial court erred. Instead, Plaintiff 
is, in essence, asking that the Supreme Court consider an 
issue being presented for the first time. This is tantamount 
to a trial de novo on an issue presented to an appellate 
court, even though it was not raised at trial. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT IS 
BARRED BY DEFENDANT'S BANKRUPTCY PROCEED-
ING. 
At trial, evidence indicated that Defendant Preston 
had filed a bankruptcy petition and that Plaintiff's claim 
against him had been eliminated thereby. Given this, 
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant must fail on this ground 
alone. 
Despite this, Plaintiff's claim on appeal is, apparently, 
that the bankruptcy court should not have discharged the 
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purported debt owed to Plaintiff. To support this contention, 
Plaintiff claims that he was erroneously listed as an un-
secured creditor in the bankruptcy file, that the bankruptcy 
court informed him that he was not allowed to file a proof 
of claim, and that Plaintiff therefore did not have an 
opportunity to assert his purported position as a secured 
creditor, thereby preventing discharge of the obligation. 
This position is erroneous. Even though Defendant's 
case may have been designated a "no asset" case, Plaintiff 
certainly would not have been prevented from petitioning 
the bankruptcy court for a re-classification as a secured 
creditor. Plaintiff, however, failed to do this, thereby 
acquiescing in discharge of the obligation. Also, Plaintiff 
does not dispute that he had notice of the bankruptcy. 
It should also be noted that any claim which Plaintiff 
might have for a lien upon Defendant's land is necessarily 
conditioned upon his demonstrating the validity of the lien. 
As shown at trial, Plaintiff's purported trust deed is 
defective for numerous reasons, including the lack of 
consideration, and therefore should not serve as the basis 
for allowing Plaintiff to be considered as a secured creditor 
in Defendant's bankruptcy proceeding. Since the trust deed 
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is materially defective, Plaintiff cannot claim that the 
instrument would have granted him the status of a secured 
creditor. His claim did not survive the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding • 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Wayne R. Preston respectfully requests that 
this court affirm the findings and judgment of the lower 
court. Appellant's brief does not assert that the trial 
court committed error; rather, Appellant is claiming 
that the matter ought to be decided on the theory of 
equitable mortgage even though the theory was not raised 
in the pleadings or at trial. Furthermore, the doctrine 
of equitable mortgage does not apply to the facts of this 
case since the intent of the parties is at best confused, 
and the evidence presented by the Defendant Wayne Preston 
is that the trust deed signed in blank was to secure the 
large investment loan he was seeking and that he had already 
paid a finder's fee of approximately $20,000.00. The trust 
deed clearly is defective, and even Appellant does not assert 
that it is valid since it was signed in blank, not properly 
notorized, has an unlawful trustee named, was apparently 
filled out in the state of Florida, and was sent to the 
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Uintah County Recorder in Vernal, Utah for recording, 
including an erroneous description. Equity would not 
be served by granting Plaintiff's request. Finally, 
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant is barred because 
it was extinguished by the Defendant's bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
DATED this /7*6day of May, 19 85. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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